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Remembering Justice Antonin Scalia
Alan B. Morrison

†

There is so much to say about Justice Antonin Scalia. He
has already been the subject of a full biography by Joan
1
Biskupic (American Original ) and a two-person play (The
2
Originalist ), both of which captured the essence of what made
him such a polarizing Justice. Others in this symposium will
write about his contributions to various substantive areas of
the law and to constitutional interpretation generally. I have
chosen to write about some very important parts of his nearly
thirty years on the Supreme Court bench that might not catch
the attention of others.
I. PREDICTIONS ARE HARD TO MAKE
Most Americans, indeed most lawyers, are very surprised
to learn that Justice Scalia was unanimously confirmed 98-0 by
the Senate in 1986. Part of the explanation for the vote was
that there had been a major battle over the elevation of William
Rehnquist from Associate Justice to Chief Justice, and the
opposition had largely run out of gas when it came time to
consider the Scalia nomination. But the main reason for the
lack of opposition was that then-Circuit Judge Scalia had no
record that would suggest how he would vote in controversial
cases before the Supreme Court.
What is significant about that fact is that the reason he
had no such record will apply to future nominees whose main
record is how they decided cases that came before them. Lower
court judges, even those sitting on circuit courts of appeals, are
bound to follow Supreme Court precedent, whether they agree
or not. But once on the High Court, that legal impediment is
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gone, and a Justice is free to decide a case the way he or she
thinks is correct. That does not mean that precedents are
thrown out the window, but they are less important and can be
more easily distinguished, if not overruled, when sitting on the
Supreme Court than in a lower court. In addition, Justices
change their views once on the High Court, even if they are in
their mid-50s when appointed. Justices Harry Blackmun and
John Paul Stevens are two examples of Justices whose views
“evolved” over their tenures to become more skeptical of
government. And Chief Justice Rehnquist evolved in a different
way when he became Chief: as an Associate Justice he
frequently concurred and dissented, but he did that much less
often after he was elevated to Chief Justice.
There is another reason why Judge Scalia’s record was a
poor indicator of what his Supreme Court record would be: the
very different mix of cases in the two fora, especially because
he sat on the D.C. Circuit. There are a number of respects in
which the case mix in the D.C. Circuit differs from that of other
federal circuits. First, a very high percentage of cases are either
direct appeals from administrative agencies or come from
judgments involving those agencies that originate in the
District Court for the District of Columbia. Other appeals
courts have some (and in the case of immigration cases, many
more) of those kinds of cases, but most of the most significant of
these cases come to the D.C. Circuit. These cases raise
important issues, some of constitutional magnitude, but they
rarely raise the kind of hot-button issue that would cause
trouble in a confirmation hearing or be the subject of a public
controversy. In fact, Judge Scalia did have a record in
administrative law on the issue of standing, and while he was
less willing to allow cases to proceed than others, his views at
that time could not have been characterized as extreme.
Second, the criminal docket of direct appeals is small, but
the distinguishing feature in this subject area is that there are
no prisons in the District of Columbia from which state and
federal habeas corpus cases emanate. By contrast, other federal
circuits and the Supreme Court have very significant habeas
dockets, so a nominee from another circuit might have more of
a record on issues such as the reach of the Fourth Amendment,
the applicability of the Confrontation Clause to hearsay
allowed under state law, and the extent to which the right to
trial by jury applies to criminal sentences—and the
retroactivity of new rules of criminal procedure—, all of which
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became subjects on which he had much to say on the Supreme
4
Court.
Third, the issues with which he is most strongly identified
today—abortion, affirmative action, free speech (often in an
election context), the religion clauses, and gun rights—were not
litigated in the D.C. Circuit either while he was there or
afterwards, with the exception of gun cases and a few election
law cases. Part of this is explainable because those cases are
generally based on state or local laws: the D.C. Circuit’s one
jurisdiction generally stays away from controversies in these
areas, or is overruled by Congress if the city oversteps what its
overseers see as its proper boundaries.
To be sure, Judge Scalia served on the D.C. Circuit for only
four years, whereas the current nominee, Chief Judge Merrick
Garland, has been on that Court for almost twenty years. But
those seeking reasons to reject the Garland nomination have
found that he has not sat on many controversial cases, and
when he has, he has taken largely mainstream positions. Judge
Garland is a moderate person, by temperament and judicial
philosophy, but to many who thought they knew Judge Scalia
reasonably well when he was appointed, he turned out to be a
much different Justice than they had expected. The bottom line
on this point is Justice Scalia’s tenure on the Court shows that
Yogi Berra was correct when he observed, “predictions are very
difficult, especially when they are about the future.”
II. CHALLENGES AT ORAL ARGUMENT
Any lawyer who will argue a case before the Supreme
Court either knows or is told well beforehand not to plan on
speaking very long and be prepared to answer a barrage of
questions. Except for Justice Thomas, the other Justices are all
very active. Even with the death of Justice Scalia, who was
probably at the top of the list of questioners for most
arguments, the Court is not likely to revert to the days when
counsel could make lengthy openings and get questions from
only a few of the Justices.

4. His views on the death penalty had not been the subject of his
decisions in the D.C. Circuit, but that would not have been different had he
been on other circuit courts in the early 1980s because the surge in postFurman cases had not yet percolated to the federal courts of appeals. See
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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In many cases, you knew where Justice Scalia was likely to
come out, and you had to be prepared for very tough questions,
with no opportunity to give an answer designed to hide a
weakness and hope to move on. If you did not answer his
question, Justice Scalia did not let go, or at least not until he
became convinced that you had no answer, or none that would
satisfy him. He often spoke early in the argument, but if he did
not pose a question for the petitioner, respondent’s counsel had
better be ready. The Justice would often rock back in his chair
and then pounce on counsel with a question that was rarely
neutral, but at least you knew what he thought about the issue.
In his informal talks, Justice Scalia often spoke about oral
arguments, and the one thought that has always stayed with
me is his question, “what are the five worst words counsel can
utter in response to a hypothetical question?” Answer: “that is
not this case,” to which the Justice would always say something
along the lines of, “of course we know what this case is about;
we are not morons.” He would then tell his audience that the
judge is asking about the next case to help the judge decide
which way to go on this one. He would then add that once you
have answered the question the judge has asked, not the one
you wish had been asked, you can then explain why that case is
different from this, or why your position in this case does not
lead inexorably to the undesirable outcome in the next one. His
point, which is not limited to next-case questions, is that
questions should be seen as opportunities and not obstacles,
because you have the judge’s attention and perhaps can dispel
a misguided notion that might otherwise doom your case.
Over the years, I have done a number of moot courts for
lawyers arguing in the Supreme Court for the first time, and
the subject of what to do about Justice Scalia’s likely hostile
questions often was raised. My answer was that you had to do
your best to respond, but recognize that your answer may not
persuade him, and then remember that Justice Scalia had only
one vote. That was meant not only as a factual assertion, but as
a reminder not to answer a question in a way that you hoped
would get the Scalia vote, if it meant sacrificing other votes you
needed to get to five. It also meant that you sometimes needed
to try to shift gears and hope to engage other Justices who were
more likely to agree with you than Justice Scalia.
III. THE USE AND MISUSE OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Before Judge Scalia became Justice Scalia, Supreme Court
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advocates as well as the Justices would use legislative history
extensively to support their preferred reading of federal
statutes. This included not only committee reports and
statements by the main sponsors, but also discussions at
committee hearings on a bill and floor statements by random
members, including some from an era when the Congressional
Record did not distinguish between those statements actually
delivered on the floor, and those simply inserted into the
Record. Justice Scalia would have none of that. His view was
that the only thing that mattered was the text of the law
actually voted on by both Houses of Congress and signed into
law by the President, and so for him, all legislative history was
out of bounds.
The Justice advanced his positions in opinions in which he
explained why he considered the use of legislative history to be
illegitimate, but he found a unique way to express his
continued opposition to its use once his main argument had
become clear to all. In cases in which he agreed with the
outcome and the basic reasoning of the majority, but in which
the author of the opinion included a section using legislative
history to support the outcome, Justice Scalia would file an
opinion concurring, except as to the legislative history section
or sometimes excepting to a footnote in which some mention of
the forbidden subject was made. Finally, as time passed and
other Justices continued to use legislative history, that section
of their opinion would begin with a phrase such as “for those
who find legislative history useful . . . ,” from which Justice
Scalia apparently concluded that he had largely won the battle
and no longer felt the need to concur, except as to that section.
Justice Scalia did not win the legislative history war, but
he did succeed in narrowing the battlefield considerably. While
I have not attempted (and do not intend to attempt) to do a
scientific survey of the average number of legislative history
citations per case or per 100 words of Supreme Court opinions
in the past decade as compared to the years before Justice
Scalia joined the Court, I am confident, as a regular reader of
Court opinions, that the number is way down. But perhaps
more important than the numbers are the portions of
legislative history cited. Now the citations are to the conference
committee reports (which are often the only thing members
read because they are written in non-legalese) or perhaps to the
portions of the House or Senate committee reports that explain,
in broad terms, what the law is designed to accomplish. These
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reports, which may be written by staff, but are reviewed by the
committee chairs, ranking members, and others most
interested in the bills, often explain the purpose behind the law
and help illuminate the meaning of provisions that otherwise
seem quite opaque. In other situations, when the issue relates
to a particular subsection, and everything in the legislative
history points in one direction, most Justices are still willing to
take that information into account in trying to understand
what the enacted text means. And Justice Scalia’s main point—
that at best statements by individual members reflect only
their views, no matter what position they held in relation to a
particular bill—has been largely (if silently) accepted, most of
the time, by most of the Justices. That may not be total victory,
but it is a major accomplishment, neither liberal nor
conservative, for which Justice Scalia deserves most of the
credit.
There is one category of legislative history that the Justice
opposed on which he is off the mark. The process by which the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (as well as those for Appellate
Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, and Bankruptcy) are
amended is a very thorough and complicated one. For each of
these areas there is a committee which is comprised of judges,
practicing lawyers, and academics, as well as one or more law
professor reporters with expertise in that area. Before an
amendment is approved by the Supreme Court, it goes through
an extensive notice and comment process, often with public
hearings and with committee meetings open to all interested
persons. Accompanying each amendment are what are called
Advisory Notes, which are initially drafted by the reporters, but
thoroughly reviewed and edited in detail by the committee
members, although not by the Justices whose approval is
needed before they become effective. Despite this pedigree,
Justice Scalia stated in his concurrence in Krupski v. Costa
Crociere S.p.A. that these notes were simply another form of
legislative history, not worthy of consideration except to the
5
extent that it is like other scholarly commentary —a belief for
which he was rightly taken to task by Duke Law Professor Paul
Carrington, who was the Civil Rules Committee Reporter at the
6
time that the offending notes were written.

5. 560 U.S. 538, 557 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
6. Paul Carrington, Commentary: Showing Disdain for Official
Legislative History, NAT’L L. J. (Aug. 11, 2010), http://www
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Justice Scalia’s distaste for legislative history did not
extend to constitutional history, as best exemplified in his
7
detailed reliance on it in District of Columbia v. Heller, in
sustaining a broad reading of the right to bear arms under the
Second Amendment. His consideration there included English
history, the colonial experience, what the states were doing at
the time the amendment was enacted, and even what happened
in the states after it became law. To be sure, the analogies to
legislative history in statutes are not precise, but they are close
enough to require some explanation for their differing
treatment; however, the Justice (to my knowledge) never
attempted to defend those differences. Moreover, to the extent
that Justice Scalia found the Federalist Papers to be helpful in
other cases, they suffer from three deficiencies that should have
made them at least as suspect as conventional legislative
history: they were (anonymous) advocacy pieces, written by
only one person (per paper), and they appeared after the
8
language in the Constitution had already been agreed upon.
IV. THE LONE DISSENTER
Early in his time on the High Court, Justice Scalia
demonstrated his willingness to stand by his views, even in the
face of unanimous opposition in cases of major constitutional
and practical significance. I refer to his dissents in the
separation of powers challenges to the independent counsel
9
10
statute and the federal sentencing guidelines. As the junior
Justice in both cases, and with the outcome not in doubt, many
judges would have simply gone along or written brief dissents,
but that was not Justice Scalia. In both cases, he wrote
impassioned dissents explaining at great length why the
Constitution did not allow either scheme.

.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202464644806?keywords=Showing+disdain+for+
official+legislative+history&publication=National+Law+Journal.
7. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
8. The notes from the Convention are further suspect because, unlike
proceedings in Congress, which are taken verbatim by a court reporter, the
notes are those of participants in the deliberations. I shudder to think that
anyone would ever rely on my notes of a meeting or even a lecture, assuming
that my handwriting and abbreviations could be deciphered.
9. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
10. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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Today, the independent counsel act is no longer on the
books, although attorneys general continue to appoint them
from time to time. Congress’s decision not to renew the law was
prompted by the many practical problems that resulted from its
operation in several situations, most notably and probably of
greatest influence, the Whitewater investigation and the
eventual, but unsuccessful, impeachment of President Clinton.
The sentencing guidelines, which were actually much less
flexible than their name implied, eventually became advisory,
the result of a series of decisions interpreting the constitutional
right to trial by jury as precluding judges from making factual
findings that increased the sentence of a defendant. In neither
case would it be accurate to say that Justice Scalia’s opinions
became the law by changing the views of his colleagues on the
original issues, but the concerns that he expressed in both
dissents became part of the reason why those schemes no
longer exist in their prior form.
To be sure, Justice Scalia was not always a lone dissenter,
some of his dissents became the views of the majority, and he is
surely not the only Justice who was ever, or even often, a lone
dissenter. But these two dissents are special because they were
early in his time on the Court, the cases were of great
significance, and he expressed his views at length and in very
passionate terms. Thus, they can be seen as a harbinger of
opinions to come and of his willingness to stand his intellectual
ground even when no one else agreed with him.
V. THE DOOMSDAY FORECASTER
Justice Scalia was well-known for his attacks, sometimes
bordering on the personal, on the opinions of other Justices,
especially in his concurrences and dissents. What has been less
noted were his doomsday predictions of what would happen in
the wake of a majority opinion with which he disagreed. One
11
famous example is his dissent in Lawrence v. Texas, in which
he predicted that striking down the ban on sodomy would lead
to the invalidation of laws that limited marriage to opposite sex
12
couples. He reinforced that prediction in his dissent in United
13
States v. Windsor, striking down the Federal Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA), and these predictions came true in
11. 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 604–05
13. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2709–11 (2013) (Scalia J., dissenting).
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Obergefell v. Hodges. It is doubtful that opponents of the ban
on same-sex marriage were buoyed by the Scalia dissents to
challenge those laws, but there is no doubt that his dissent in
the DOMA case was cited by many lower court judges to justify
15
taking the next step that led to Obergefell.
As the term wound down last June, it seemed to me that
Justice Scalia’s doomsday predictions were on the increase and
that the tones of his disagreements were raised a notch, if not a
decibel, or two. I collected a half-dozen of my favorites from
that term in an essay titled “Summersaults of Statutory
16
17
Interpretation,” a Scalia quote from King v. Burwell. In his
18
dissent in Zivotofsky v. Kerry, he likened the power given to
the President to that possessed by the King of England and
prophesized that the decision “will systematically favor the
unitary President over the plural Congress in disputes
involving foreign affairs,” which will result in a foreign policy
19
“perhaps as effective as that of a monarchy.” But, he
continued, “[i]t is certain that, in the long run, it will erode the
structure of separated powers that the People established for
20
the protection of their liberty.”
In Obergefell he decried that the majority “says that my
Ruler, and the Ruler of 320 million Americans coast-to-coast, is
21
a majority of the nine lawyers on the Supreme Court.” He
viewed the decision as “tak[ing] from the People a question
properly left to them” and “unabashedly based not on law, but
on the ‘reasoned judgment’ of a bare majority of this Court,”

14. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
15. See, e.g., Condon v. Haley, 21 F. Supp. 3d 572, 582 (D.S.C. 2014)
(“Although the Windsor holding dealt only with the validity of certain
provisions of federal statutory law, Justice Scalia, writing in dissent, correctly
predicted that an assault on state same sex marriage bans would follow
Windsor.”)
16. Alan B. Morrison, Somersaults of Statutory Interpretation,
SLATE (July 22, 2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/
jurisprudence/2015/07/antonin_scalia_s_angry_opinions_the_supreme_court_
s_decisions_are_dangerous.html. My original title, which was changed without
notice at the last minute, was “Crying Wolf.”
17. 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2507 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The somersaults
of statutory interpretation they have performed . . . will be cited by litigants
endlessly, to the confusion of honest jurisprudence.”)
18. 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2116 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 2123.
20. Id.
21. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2627 (2015).
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from which he concluded that “we move one step closer to being
22
reminded of our [the People’s] impotence.”
23
His dissent in King v. Burwell, the most recent Affordable
Care Act decision, concluded that, based on the majority’s
opinion, “[w]ords no longer have meaning” and that it “is hard
to come up with a clearer way” to say the opposite of how the
24
majority read the law. After proceeding through what he saw
were fatal defects in the majority’s opinion, prefaced by phrases
25
such as “making matters worse,” “for its next defense of the
26
27
indefensible,” and “even less defensible, if possible,” the
Justice zeroed in on what he saw as the heart of the problem:
“[t]oday’s opinion changes the usual rules of statutory
interpretation for the sake of the Affordable Care Act” because
of “the Court’s decision to take matters into its own hands”
instead of allowing Congress to address whatever problems
28
there might be.
Perhaps the most overstated of Scalia’s dissents was
29
Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama. His opinion
began: “[t]oday, the Court issues a sweeping holding that will
have profound implications for the constitutional ideal of one
person, one vote, for the future of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
and for the primacy of the State in managing its own
30
elections.” He predicted that the “consequences of this
unprincipled decision will reverberate far beyond the narrow
circumstances presented in this case,” suggesting that the
31
majority had made a major change in the law. However, his
disagreement was only over whether it was proper to allow the
plaintiffs to make certain allegations before the Supreme Court
that they had omitted below and thus keep the case alive. How
that irreparably damaged the principle of one person, one vote
is far from clear.
Whenever one dissents, whether in a judicial decision or a
faculty committee, a choice must be made between attempting
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 2631.
135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2497.
Id. at 2498.
Id. at 2502.
Id. at 2506.
Id.
135 S. Ct. 1257, 1274 (2015) (Scalia J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1281.
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to narrow the majority’s decision or pointing out its potentially
apocalyptic consequences. Justice Scalia has chosen the second
option as his preferred choice in most cases. It no doubt made
him feel better that he had fully expressed his misgivings in
clear terms, but whether it helped his long range goals of
reigning in a Court that he concluded was no longer
interpreting the law, but making it up, remains to be seen.

